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Introduction 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is in dire political straits. 
Twenty years after the signing of the Dayton Peace 
Accord, which brought to an end the bloody civil war 
that had raged during the first half of the 1990s, the 
country remains deeply divided. Its political institutions 
are dysfunctional and the economy remains weak.1 
Despite strong international pressure, there appears to 
be little prospect that the situation will improve 
significantly in the foreseeable future. A high-profile 
European Union initiative to introduce much needed 
constitutional reform failed to bring about meaningful 
compromise. Meanwhile, many observers are sceptical 
that a ‘new approach’ towards Bosnia,2 launched by the 
EU in December 2014, will bring about fundamental 
political, economic and social change.3 
 
                                                          
1 R. Bruce Hitchner, ‘Dayton’s Successes Offer Reform Lessons for 
Bosnia’, Balkan Insight, 18 November 2015. By way of example, per 
capita incomes are 20 per cent lower than the Yugoslav era. Simon 
Davies, ‘Were Bosnia’s ‘good ol’ days’ really that good?’, Brookings, 
30 June 2015 < http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/future-
development/posts/2015/06/30-bosnia-yugoslavia-growth-davies > 
(Last accessed 3 November 2015.) 
2 ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina: Progress Report’, European Commission, 
November 2015, p.1.  
3 Toby Vogel, ‘No strategy for Bosnia - other than enlargement’, EU 
Observer, 5 March 2015; Kurt Bassuener, Senior associate at the 
Democratization Policy Council in Sarajevo, ‘Judy Asks: Is the EU 
Sleeping on the Western Balkans?’, Carnegie Europe, 13 May 2015. 
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It is against this backdrop that there has been 
growing concern that Republika Srpska (RS), the Bosnian 
Serb entity that makes up 49 per cent of the territory of 
the country, is laying the foundations for an attempt to 
break away. While the threat of a unilateral declaration 
of independence (UDI) has remained a constant, though 
somewhat background, concern since the end of the 
war, fears of secession have gained greater currency 
over the past decade. These worries have been primarily 
driven by the increasingly confrontational tone adopted 
by Milorad Dodik, the President of Republika Srpska, 
who is now openly calling for a referendum on 
independence to be held within the next few years.4 
Under the current bleak economic and political 
conditions, such talk inevitably fuels tensions and 
instability. Indeed, some observers now suggest that the 
country could return to armed conflict.5 
 
But just how seriously should such threats of 
secession be taken? This paper seeks to answer this 
question by looking at the legal and political 
impediments to a unilateral declaration of 
independence by Republika Srpska. The first part briefly 
examines the emergence of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a 
sovereign state and outlines the current political 
situation in the country. It then explores the structural 
                                                          
4 ‘Biggest Serb Party in Bosnia Threatens 2018 Secession’, Reuters, 
25 April 2015. 
5 James Lyon, ‘Is War About to Break Out in the Balkans?’, Foreign 
Policy, 26 October 2015. 
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legal and political constraints on territories wishing to 
secede. Thereafter, it analyses the specific obstacles to 
secession in the Bosnian case. Next, it explains why 
other examples of secession, or attempted secession, 
such as Kosovo or Scotland, do not have a bearing on 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. It then explains the reasons 
why such a move would require Serbia’s direct support 
and why this would not happen. Finally, the paper notes 
that, given that secession is not a viable prospect, the 
steps leading up to secession – such as a referendum or 
even a declaration of independence – should not be 
given undue significance. In conclusion, the article 
suggests that secession is not in fact the threat that 
some present it to be. Instead, the greater factor 
undermining peace and stability in the country is the 
perception that a unilateral declaration of independence 
is a genuine and realistic threat to the territorial 
integrity of the state. 
 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1995 
 
On 3 March 1992, just months after Slovenia and 
Croatia broke away from the Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina declared 
independence. Having strongly opposed any attempt by 
Bosnia to secede from the Yugoslav state, which was by 
this stage widely recognised to be in the process of 
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dissolution,6 the Bosnian Serbs retaliated. On 6 April 
they declared their own independent state, Republika 
Srpska. Thus began a war that was to last for the next 
three and a half years. However, while the new Bosnian 
state was soon recognised internationally, and admitted 
to the United Nations on 22 May, the Bosnian Serb 
entity was universally condemned. On 16 November 
1992, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 787. 
This called on states to recognise the territorial integrity 
of Bosnia and affirmed that, ‘any entities unilaterally 
declared…will not be accepted’. 
 
Despite numerous efforts to broker an end to the 
fighting,7 by the summer of 1995 half the country lay 
under Bosnian Serb control. However, the tide was 
turning. The massacre committed by Bosnian Serb forces 
at Srebrenica, and Croatia’s success in ending an 
attempted secession by ethnic Serbs on its territory,8 
                                                          
6 Opinion Number 1, Badinter Arbitration Committee. Reprinted in 
European Journal of International Law, Number 3, 1992. For an 
analysis of many of the legal issues surrounding the break up of 
Yugoslavia see Ana S. Trbovich, A Legal Geography of Yugoslavia’s 
Disintegration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). On the 
politics of recognition, see Richard Caplan, Europe and the 
Recognition of New States in Yugoslavia (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). 
7 See James Gow, Triumph of of the Lack of Will: International 
Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War (London: Hurst, 1997). 
8 For more on the secession of Krajina see, Pål Kølsto and Davor 
Paukovic, ‘The Short and Brutish Life of Republika Srpska Krajina: 
Failure of the De facto State’, Ethnopolitics, Volume 13, Number 4, 
2014; Peter Radan, ‘The Serb Krajina: An Unsuccessful Secession 
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galvanised international opinion. A new peace process 
was launched. On 21 November 1995, the presidents of 
Yugoslavia, Croatia and Bosnia – Slobodan Miloševic, 
Franjo Tudjman and Alija Izetbegović – agreed to the 
General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.9 Otherwise known as the Dayton Peace 
Accord, the agreement brought to an end a bloody civil 
war that had left over 100,000 dead,10 hundreds of 
thousands displaced and had seen some of the worst 
human rights atrocities committed in Europe since the 
end of the Second World War. 
 
The Accord established a complex and highly 
decentralised power sharing agreement focused on two 
sub-state entities:11 The Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, which had been formed as a result of an 
agreement between the Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) and 
                                                                                                               
from Croatia’, in Aleksandar Pavković and Peter Radan, The Ashgate 
Research Companion to Secession (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011). 
9 The full text of the agreement and the various annexes can be 
found at < http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=380 > 
(Last accessed, 8 December 2015). 
10 Jan Zwierzchowski and Eva Tabeau, ‘The 1992-1995 War in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina: Census-Based Multiple System Estimation of 
Casualties Undercount’, Conference Paper for the International 
Research Workshop on ‘The Global Costs of Conflict’, The 
Households in Conflict Network (HiCN) and The German Institute for 
Economics Research (DIW Berlin), Berlin, 1-2 February 2010. 
11 It has been noted that eighty per cent of state functions were 
centred on the entities. Christophe Solioz, Turning Points in Post-
War Bosnia: Ownership Process and European Integration (Baden-
Baden: Nomos, 2007), p.32. 
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Croatian communities in 1994, and Republika Srpska. 
Under the terms of Articles 1 and 3 of the Constitution, 
RS now became an integral part of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.12 While the two entities continued to 
maintain certain facets of statehood,13 such as limited 
competences over external relations,14 overall 
responsibility for foreign policy, traditionally regarded as 
a key function of statehood, was vested in the central 
state institutions.15 At the same time, UN Security 
                                                          
12 Article 1: ‘Continuation. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
the official name of which shall henceforth be "Bosnia and 
Herzegovina," shall continue its legal existence under international 
law as a state, with its internal structure modified as provided 
herein and with its present internationally recognized borders. It 
shall remain a Member State of the United Nations and may as 
Bosnia and Herzegovina maintain or apply for membership in 
organizations within the United Nations system and other 
international organizations.’ Article 3: ‘Composition. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina shall consist of the two Entities, the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska (hereinafter "the 
Entities").’ 
13 Richard Caplan, ‘International Authority and State Building: The 
Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina’, Global Governance, Volume 10, 
Number 1, 2004, pp.55-56. 
14 For example, the constitution states that, ‘the Entities shall have 
the right to establish special parallel relationships with neighboring 
states consistent with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.’ (Article III, para.2(a)) and ‘Each Entity may 
also enter into agreements with states and international 
organizations with the consent of the Parliamentary Assembly. The 
Parliamentary Assembly may provide by law that certain types of 
agreements do not require such consent.’ (Article 3, para.2 (d)). 
15 Article III, paragraph 1 of the Constitution. This did not necessarily 
make matter easier inasmuch as many decisions required the 
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Council Resolution 1031, which endorsed the Accord, 
also reaffirmed the international community’s 
commitment to the sovereignty, independence and 
territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
underlined the importance of recognising the 
internationally accepted borders of all the states of the 
former Yugoslavia.16  
 
In addition to the provisions of the Agreement 
protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the 
Bosnian state, certain extra safeguards were created to 
ensure that the Agreement was respected by the 
parties. Chief amongst these was the appointment of a 
High Representative, who was, inter alia, given a role in 
monitoring the implementation of the peace settlement; 
maintain close contact with the parties to ensure their 
compliance with the agreement; facilitate the resolution 
of difficulties arising from the civilian implementation; 
and report on progress made in the implementation of 
                                                                                                               
unanimous decision of the tripartite presidency. One example is 
Bosnia’s recognition of Kosovo. Although agreed to by the Bosniak 
and Croatian members of the presidency, this has been rejected by 
successive Serb members, thus ensuring that Bosnia cannot 
recognise Kosovo. ‘“Bosnia’s current govt. won't consider Kosovo 
recognition”’, B92, 23 October 2015. 
16 UN Security Council Resolution 1031 (1995): ‘Reaffirming its 
commitment to a negotiated political settlement of the conflicts in 
the former Yugoslavia, preserving the territorial integrity of all 
States there within their internationally recognized borders’; 
‘Welcomes the progress made towards mutual recognition among 
the successor States to the former Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, within their internationally recognized borders’. 
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the agreement to the UN and other interested 
organisations and states.17 However, these powers 
proved insufficient to advance the peace process.18 In 
December 1997, the role of the High Representative was 
dramatically increased to further the implementation of 
the Dayton Accords. These new competencies – the so-
called ‘Bonn Powers’ – included the right to impose 
legislation where agreement between the parties was 
not possible and the ability to remove public officials 
from their posts in the event that they violated the 
terms of the peace agreement.19 
 
                                                          
17 ‘Agreement on Civilian Implementation’, Annex 10, Article II. 
18 ‘Opinion on the Constitutional Situation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the Powers of the High Representative’, European 
Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), 
Venice, 11 March 2005, p.5. 
19 For a comprehensive legal analysis if these powers see Tim 
Banning, ‘The ‘Bonn Powers’ of the High Representative in Bosnia 
Herzegovina: Tracing a Legal Figment’, Goettingen Journal of 
International Law, Volume 6, Number 2, 2014. See also Gerald 
Knaus and Felix Martin: The Travails of the European Raj’, Journal of 
Democracy, Volume 14, Number 3, 2003. As has also been said, ‘the 
method selected by the HR [High Representative] to promote 
“democracy” in Bosnia is to create a dictatorship of virtue’. Robert 
M. Hayden, ‘Bosnia: The Contradictions of “Democracy” without 
Consent’, East European Constitutional Review, Volume 7, Number 
2, 1998. For a good overview of how the role of the HR has evolved 
under various holders, see Adis Merdzanovic, Democracy by Decree: 
Prospects and Limits of Imposed Consociational Democracy in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Stuttgart: Ibidem, 2015). 
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While Dayton brought an end to the fighting, 
internally the country remained deeply divided.20 For 
many Bosniaks, resentment at what they saw as the 
legitimisation of a Serbian entity created from ethnic 
cleansing and genocide ran deep.21 Meanwhile, although 
support for violent separatism diminished,22 Bosnian 
Serbs felt little loyalty to the Bosnian state. 
Nevertheless, the hope was that with the passage of 
time a stronger and more united Bosnian national 
identity would emerge, and with it more political 
cooperation between the entities. At first, there were 
some signals that this could happen. In the years that 
followed, unified customs and intelligence services were 
created. Likewise, in 2005, the armed forces of the 
Federation and Republia Srpska were brought together 
into a single national army – a development that is often 
cited as one of the most significant achievements of the 
post-war period in Bosnia.23 However, in contrast to the 
                                                          
20 Sumantra Bose, Bosnia after Dayton: Nationalist Partition and 
International Intervention (London: Hurst, 2002). See also, Victor D. 
Bojkov, ‘Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Post-1995 Political 
System and its Functioning’, South East European Politics, Volume 4, 
Number 1, May 2003, p.51. 
21 Andrew MacDowall, ‘Dayton Ain’t Going Nowhere’, Foreign 
Policy, 12 December 2015. 
22 Florian Bieber, ‘Bosnia-Herzegovina: Slow Progress towards a 
Functional State’, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 
Volume 6, Number 1, 2006, p.45. 
23 Cvete Koneska, After Ethnic Conflict: Policy-Making in Post-
Conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014), p.94. 
For more on this see, Heinz Vetschera and Matthieu Damian, 
‘Security Sector Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Role of the 
11 
 
progress made in the first decade after Dayton,24 the last 
ten years have seen the situation deteriorate.25 For 
example, a high-profile effort to create a single unified 
police force failed.26 Meanwhile, in 2009, the European 
Court of Human Rights judged that the ethnic provisions 
in parts of the state institutions, especially the 
presidency, but also the House of Peoples, contravened 
the European Convention on Human Rights.27 This will 
require a fundamental change to the constitution. 
 
                                                                                                               
International Community’, International Peacekeeping, Volume 13, 
Issue 1, 2006. 
24 For a good overview of the first decade see Florian Bieber, ‘After 
Dayton, Dayton? The Evolution of an Unpopular Peace’, 
Ethnopolitics, Volume 5, Number 1, March 2006. 
25 Robert Belloni, ‘Bosnia: Dayton is Dead! Long Live Dayton!’, 
Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Volume 15, Numbers 3-4, 2009. 
26 Ana E. Juncos, ‘Europeanization by Decree? The Case of Police 
Reform in Bosnia’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Volume 49, 
Issue 2, 2011; Gemma Collantes Celador, ‘Becoming ‘European’ 
through Police Reform: A Successful Strategy in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina?’, Crime, Law and Social Change, Volume 51, Number 
2, 2009. 
27 ‘Sejdić & Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina’, European Court of 
Human Rights, App. Nos. 27996/06 & 34836/06, 22 December 2009. 
For an examination of this case see Samo Bardutzky, ‘The 
Strasbourg Court on the Dayton Constitution: Judgment in the case 
of Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 22 December 2009’, 
European Constitutional Law Review, Volume 6, Issue 02, June 2010; 
Marko Milanovic, ‘Sejdic and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina’, 
American Journal of International Law, Volume 104, 2010. 
12 
 
Meanwhile, political confrontation has grown.28 
Just as many within the Bosniak community are 
determined to centralise power wherever possible,29 
many Bosnian Serbs tug in the other direction. As a 
result, over the course of the past decade, talk has 
increasingly turned to secession. This first became 
pronounced in the run up to October 2006 election, 
when the then prime minister of Republika Srpska, 
Milorad Dodik, suggested that if Kosovo was allowed to 
become independent, then so should the Bosnian Serb 
entity.30 Since then, he has continued to challenge the 
authority of the central state and now openly states that 
he believes that RS will eventually emerge as an 
independent state.31 More to the point, he actually 
appears to be paving the way for a formal attempt to 
break away. In 2015, Dodik’s Party, the Alliance of 
Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), issued a 
declaration stating that RS intends to hold a referendum 
on independence in 2018.32 Inevitably, such talk has 
                                                          
28 For a brief overview of peacebuilding processes over the past 20 
years see Soeren Keil and Anastasiia Kudlenko, ‘Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 20 Years after Dayton: Complexity Born of Paradoxes’, 
International Peacekeeping, Volume 25, Number 5, 2015. 
29 EU official in Bosnia, comments to the author, January 2007 
30 Niels van Willigen, Peacebuilding and International 
Administration: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina (London: 
Routledge, 2013), p.148. 
31 ‘Dodik: Republika Srpska Will Be Independent’, Balkan Insight, 5 
October 2012. 
32 As Valentin Inzko, the High Representative in Bosnia has stated, 
‘While it is only a party document that has no official value, I am 
nevertheless concerned by its threat to hold an independence 
13 
 
fuelled concerns about the continued existence of a 
unified Bosnian state. This in turn has fed the view that 
that the country could face the prospect of fighting 
again. Within the Bosniak community there are those, 
especially veterans, who are now talking about a return 
to armed conflict if RS does attempt to break away.33 
This is a dangerous development, especially as there is 
no realistic chance that Republika Srpska could 
successfully break away from Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 
 
Legal and Political Impediments to Secession 
 
Any territory seeking to secede in the 
contemporary international system faces enormous 
structural opposition. In general, the international 
community has a very strong aversion to acts of 
secession.34 Wishing to protect their own sovereignty 
and territorial integrity, over the course of the last two 
hundred and fifty years states have tended to take a 
very strong line against separatist initiatives.35 This has 
                                                                                                               
referendum by a specified time.’ ‘Remarks by High Representative 
Valentin Inzko to the United Nations Security Council’, Office of the 
High Representative, 10 November 2015. 
33 International official, comment to the author, October 2015. 
34 Daniel Fierstein, ‘Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence: An 
Incident Analysis of Legality, Policy and Future Implications’, Boston 
University International Law Journal, Volume 26, Number 2, 2008, 
pp.417-442.  
35 For an overview of the development of international 
attitudes to secession, see Mikulas Fabry, Recognizing States: 
14 
 
been particularly pronounced since 1945. Over the 
course of the past 70 years, the territorial integrity of 
states has come to be seen as a defining principle of 
international relations,36 even overriding the principle of 
self-determination.37  
                                                                                                               
International Society and the Establishment of New States 
Since 1776 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
36 As one judge at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) succinctly 
put it: ‘The truth is that international law upholds the territorial 
integrity of a State. One of the fundamental principles of 
contemporary international law is that of respect for the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of States. This principle entails 
an obligation to respect the definition, delineation and territorial 
integrity of an existing State. According to the principle, a State 
exercises sovereignty within and over its territorial domain. The 
principle of respect for territorial integrity is enshrined in the 
Charter of the United Nations and other international instruments.’ 
Judge Koroma, Dissenting Opinion, ‘Accordance with International 
Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of 
Kosovo’, International Court of Justice, 22 July 2010, para.21. 
37 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘National Self-Determination Today: 
Problems of Legal Theory and Practice’, International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, Volume 43, 1994, p.241. Self-
determination in these contexts came to be understood as right to 
self-government or autonomy within the existing state order. 
Daniele Archibugi, ‘A Critical Analysis of the Self-Determination of 
Peoples: A Cosmopolitan Perspective’, Constellations, Volume 10, 
Number 4, 2003, pp.493-499. As Crawford states, ‘In international 
practice there is no recognition of a unilateral right to secede based 
on a majority vote of the population of a sub-division or territory, 
whether or not that population constitutes one or more “peoples” 
in the ordinary sense of the word. In international law, self-
determination for peoples or groups within an independent state is 
15 
 
 
The strong prohibition on secession is evident 
when one considers the list of secessionist entities that 
have tried, and failed, to gain international acceptance 
over the past 70 years. Prominent efforts from the Cold 
War included Biafra’s attempt to secede from Nigeria, 
Katanga’s attempted secession from the Congo and the 
effort by the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ to 
break away from the Republic of Cyprus.38 All have failed 
to gain widespread acceptance. Meanwhile, in the post-
Cold War era, separatist territories have hardly fared 
much better. The one case that stands out is Kosovo, 
which seems to be on course for eventual acceptance by 
the international community. However, even with 
considerable lobbying by the United States and key 
members of the European Union, eight years after 
                                                                                                               
achieved by participation in the political system of the state, on the 
basis of respect for its territorial integrity.’ James A., Crawford, 
‘State Practice and International Law in Relation to Unilateral 
Secession’, Report to Government of Canada Concerning Unilateral 
Secession by Quebec, 19 February 1997. 
38 In the case of Cyprus, the UN Security Council passed 
Resolution 541 (1983), which condemned the attempt to 
create the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ as invalid 
and called for the unilateral declaration of independence to 
be withdrawn. It also called on states not to recognize any 
Cypriot State other than the Republic of Cyprus. Thereafter, 
Resolution 550 (1983) called on states, ‘not to facilitate or in 
any way assist the aforesaid secessionist entity’. 
16 
 
declaring independence from Serbia it is still only 
recognised by just over half the members of the United 
Nations (109/193 members as of March 2016). Indeed, 
Bangladesh is still widely regarded as the only truly 
successful case of unilateral secession since 1945. Even 
then, it was only accepted as a member of the United 
Nations after Pakistan, the parent state, had accepted its 
independence.39 
 
In addition to the strong opposition to acts of 
secession in a general sense, in the case of Republika 
Srpska there are also considerable specific impediments. 
As noted, the constitutional agreement reached in 1995 
was endorsed by the UN Security Council. Since then, 
the peace agreement has been endorsed by the Security 
Council on numerous other occasions, including in the 
most recent UN Resolution, passed in November 2015.40 
These have all reaffirmed the Council’s commitment to 
the territorial integrity of the States of the former 
Yugoslavia. As frequently emphasised by international 
officials serving in Bosnia,41 any attempt by Republika 
                                                          
39 Janet Musson, ‘Britain and the Recognition of Bangladesh in 
1972’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, Volume 19, Number 1, 2008. 
40 UN Security Council Resolution 2247, 10 November 2015. 
41 As Valentin Inzko, the current High Representative in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, told the UN Security Council, in November 2015, ‘As I 
have made clear repeatedly, the Peace Agreement does not grant 
the Entities the right to secede, and any attempt to change the 
Peace Agreement requires the agreement of all the parties.’ 
‘Remarks by High Representative Valentin Inzko to the United 
17 
 
Srpska to secede would thus contravene these UN 
resolutions. 
 
Moreover, any Bosnian Serb state would face 
enormous political opposition from leading powers on 
the international stage. Since the end of the war in 1995, 
the European Union and the United States have invested 
a huge amount of financial and political capital into 
Bosnia. It is simply inconceivable that they would now 
let Republika Srpska break away, especially as policy 
makers are aware that this would almost certainly lead 
to renewed fighting and bloodshed. EU member states 
have therefore been unequivocal in their condemnation 
of any talk of secession. So too have senior EU officials.42 
Likewise, the United States has repeatedly insisted that 
it too would stand fully against any attempt by 
Republika Srpska to secede. As a US official put it, 
‘Neither the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina nor 
any other part of the Dayton Accords offers any entity 
the right to secede…Any action taken by Republika 
Srpska toward the dissolution of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
would violate Dayton.’43 There is absolutely no doubt 
that the United States and the EU would condemn any 
attempt at secession in the strongest possible terms and 
                                                                                                               
Nations Security Council’, Office of the High Representative, 10 
November 2015. 
42 ‘Subject:  VP/HR — Declarations concerning the secession of 
Republika Srpska’, European Parliament, Parliamentary Questions, 
E-003801-14, 22 May 2014. 
43 ‘Conscious Uncoupling, Balkan-Style’, Newsweek, 29 April 2014. 
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would actively seek to prevent other countries from 
recognising a Bosnian Serb state. 
 
Where there is perhaps less certainty is with 
regard to Russia. However, arguments that Moscow 
could passively support a unilateral declaration of 
independence, let alone actively support an attempt to 
break away, should be treated with scepticism. To be 
sure, Russia has been playing a mischievous role in the 
Balkans in recent years.44 However, there is nothing to 
suggest that it would endorse an attempt by Republika 
Srpska to secede. For a start, all the UN resolutions 
reaffirming the territorial integrity of Bosnia have been 
passed with Russia’s acceptance, if not support.45 
Moreover, during the most recent meeting of the Peace 
Implementation Council, the international body that 
                                                          
44 For an overview of Russian activities in the regions, see ‘Russia in 
the Balkans’, Conference Report, LSEE-Research on South East 
Europe and SEESOX South East European Studies at Oxford, 13 
March 2015. One area where it has been expanding is the media. 
‘Western Balkans: EU blindspot on Russian propaganda’, EU 
Observer, 10 December 2015. 
45 That said, there were particular difficulties drafting the most 
recent resolution due to Russia’s opposition to language that 
reaffirmed Bosnia’s Euro-Atlantic integration path. ‘Bosnia and 
Herzegovina: Re-authorisation of EUFOR ALTHEA and Debate’, 
What’s in Blue: Insights on the Work of the Security Council, 9 
November 2015. In the end, the Resolution 2247 (2015) noted, ‘the 
support expressed by the Bosnia and Herzegovina’s leadership 
towards a European perspective, on the basis of the Peace 
Agreement’. 
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oversees Dayton, in December 2015, Russia signed up to 
the concluding Communique. This stated the following: 
 
The PIC SB underlined its unequivocal 
commitment to the preservation of BiH’s territorial 
integrity and sovereignty in accordance with 
international law. Under the GFAP, entities have no right 
to secede from BiH and only exist legally by virtue of the 
BiH Constitution. The PIC SB confirmed that it would 
view as a serious and imminent threat to peace and 
security any attempt to undermine the fundamental 
structure of BiH as a single, sovereign state comprising 
two entities.46 
 
Other supposed indications that Russia could 
support a Bosnian Serb state should also be treated with 
scepticism. For example, there is little reason to suppose 
that Moscow’s veto of a Security Council resolution on 
Srebrenica was designed to undermine Bosnia, even if 
that may have been the perceived intention.47 All the 
evidence suggests that the decision was in fact meant to 
secure Serbia’s gratitude rather than support Republika 
Srpska. Belgrade, which had felt that the resolution was 
too accusatory, specifically asked the Russian 
                                                          
46 ‘Communiqué of the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation 
Council’, 2 December 2015. However, it is also worth noting that 
Russia decided it was unable to join paragraphs 10 and 11, which 
condemned a planned referendum on the judiciary. 
47 James Lyon, ‘Is War About to Break Out in the Balkans?’, Foreign 
Policy, 26 October 2015. 
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Government to veto the resolution.48 Moscow obliged,49 
knowing that this was yet another useful way of shoring 
up relations with Serbia. Certainly, Serbian officials saw 
it as being clearly aimed at gathering their support, not 
that of Republika Srpska.50 
 
More broadly, there is actually little to be gained, 
and a lot to be lost, if Russia did support an attempt by 
Republika Srpska to secede. To be sure, Moscow could 
block any UN Security Council resolution explicitly 
condemning an attempt at secession. However, even if 
this did happen, it is hardly likely to result in widespread 
international support for a Bosnian Serb state. As 
already noted, there are strong steps that can be taken 
to fend off any attempt by Republika Srpska to gain 
international acceptance, even with overt backing by 
Moscow. Once again, the European Union and the 
United States would certainly issue statements declaring 
the move to be illegal and would lobby hard against any 
recognition. This would vastly outweigh any leverage 
Moscow could exert. The cases of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia are instructive in this regard. Despite strong 
pressure from Moscow,51 only four or five countries – 
                                                          
48 ‘Serbs ask Russia to veto UN resolution on Srebrenica’, Associated 
Press, 4 July 2015. 
49 ‘Russia Vetoes U.N. Resolution Calling Srebrenica Massacre ‘Crime 
of Genocide’’, New York Times, 8 July 2015. 
50 Serbian diplomat, comment to the author, November 2015.  
51 For more on these efforts, see James Ker-Lindsay, The Foreign 
Policy of Counter Secession: Preventing the Recognition of Contested 
States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
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Venezuela, Nicaragua and a couple of Pacific Island 
states – have recognised them.52 Even Russia’s closest 
traditional allies, such as Belarus and the Central Asian 
Republics, have not been persuaded to recognise them. 
Similarly, neither territory has been admitted into any 
international organisations. The lack of recognition 
afforded to Abkhazia and South Ossetia may in fact 
provide the single best reason why Moscow would not 
want to encourage Republika Srpska to secede. Russia’s 
failure to drum up support for these states has been 
very embarrassing, especially when compared to relative 
– but by no means absolute – success the United States 
and the European Union have had with regard to 
Kosovo. Having failed to secure wider international 
backing for secessionist projects so close to its heart, it is 
unlikely that the Russian government would want to be 
seen to fail yet again, this time on an issue that has 
significantly less importance domestically. 
 
Finally, even if the Russian Government did 
decide to support an act of secession, in terms of day-to-
day support there is only so much Moscow could do to 
help the Bosnian Serbs. Unlike Abkhazia or South Ossetia 
Russia does not have a land border with Republika 
Srpska. It would not, therefore, be in any position to 
provide continuous practical assistance to a breakaway 
de facto Bosnian Serb state. As will be discussed later, 
                                                          
52 The exact number is unclear. Vanuatu has changed its position on 
several occasions. ‘To Recognize or Not to Recognize Abkhazia? That 
Is Vanuatu's Question’, Radio Free Europe, 26 August 2012. 
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such support is absolutely vital if a breakaway state is to 
have any hope of merely surviving in the medium term. 
By failing to gain support for Republika Srpska, and by 
being unable to support it, Russia would be further 
signalling its isolation and relative weakness on the 
international stage. In truth, Russia has already lost the 
Balkans.53 There is no point proving it. 
 
Of course, it is not impossible to rule out the 
chance that some countries may opt to recognise 
Republika Srpska as a sovereign state if it did decide to 
declare independence. However, the numbers would be 
very low indeed. Dodik has said that he believes that as 
many as ten countries could do so.54 This seems 
excessive, even if it was just limited to de facto states 
such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh and 
Transnistria. In terms of UN members, and given the 
track record of other secessionist entities over the years, 
                                                          
53 See Dimitar Bechev, ‘Russia in the Balkans: How Should the EU 
Respond?’, European Policy Centre, Policy Brief, 12 October 2015; 
‘In the Balkans, NATO has Outmuscled Russia’, The Economist, 11 
December 2015. As was neatly put, ‘Quite possibly, the Kremlin may 
endeavor to destabilize the Western Balkans by supporting Serbian 
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inter-ethnic conflicts in Macedonia and Kosovo. But Russia 
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Janusz Bugaski and Srdjan Darmanovic, ‘NATO Moves Forward with 
Montenegro’, The Americam Interest, 8 December 205. 
54 International official, comments to the author, October 2015. 
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the weight of evidence suggests that it is highly unlikely 
that any state would recognise Republika Srpska. 
 
 
The effects of other attempts at secession 
 
While there are strong international legal and 
political factors that work against an attempt by 
Republika Srpska to secede, Dodik has nevertheless 
pointed to trends in the international system that, in his 
view, support a Bosnian Serb right to statehood and will 
eventually lead to independence. One particular case 
that he has cited on a number of occasions is the 2008 
unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo.55 
While it is certainly true that, at the time, Kosovo was 
seen by many groups to be a potential model for 
unilateral secession without the explicit endorsement of 
the UN Security Council, or the parent state,56 it seems 
                                                          
55 For background on Kosovo’s secession see James Ker-Lindsay, 
Kosovo: The Path to Contested Statehood in the Balkans (London: 
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56 See, for example, ‘Push at U.N. for Kosovo independence 
could bolster secessionist demands around the world’, 
Associated Press, 17 May 2007; ‘The independence 
precedent: If Kosovo goes free’, The Economist, 29 November 
2007; ‘Breakaway regions look to Kosovo precedent’, Reuters, 
9 December 2007; Mark Almond, ‘Unrecognized States’, 
International Herald Tribune, 6 December 2007; ‘Kosovo's 
looming independence raises question: Why not Scotland or 
Vermont?’, Associated Press, 15 February 2008; ‘Kosovo 
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its influence on other secessionist conflicts has in fact 
been contained. Rather than create a precedent for 
secession in practical terms, Kosovo has instead 
highlighted just how important it is to have strong 
support from major powers. The reason Kosovo is now 
recognised by more than half of the members of the 
United Nations is because it has been openly supported 
by the United States and the leading members of the EU, 
including Britain, France and Germany. Insisting that 
Kosovo is sui generis, a ‘unique case’ in international 
politics that falls outside of the boundaries of normal 
secession,57 these countries have actively lobbied for 
                                                                                                               
report linked to Transnistria independence’, The Tiraspol 
Times, 27 March 2007; S. Sathananthan, ‘What lessons could 
Tamils draw from the Kosovo experience?’, NorthEastern 
Monthly, May–June 2007; ‘Turkish Cypriots eye Kosovo for 
own future’, Turkish Daily News, 27 December 2007. ‘Kosovo 
“will boost Karabakh recognition drive”’, Reuters, 16 February 
2008. ‘Georgia rebel region seeks recognition after Kosovo’, 
Reuters, 5 March 2008. As one commentator noted in 
response to the claim that Kosovo was a special case, ‘Kosovo 
is unique, and there will be more Kosovos.’ Timothy Garton 
Ash, ‘The Kosovo Precedent’, Los Angeles Times, 21 February 
2008.  
57 See, for example, the statement by EU members following 
Kosovo’s declaration of independence: ‘The Council reiterates the 
EU’s adherence to the principles of the UN Charter and the Helsinki 
Final Act, inter alia the principles of sovereignty and territorial 
integrity and all UN Security Council resolutions. It underlines its 
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Kosovo’s recognition and have played a crucial role in 
generating support for its membership of key 
international organisations, such as the IMF and Word 
Bank.58 As already noted, in the event that the Republika 
Srpska declared independence, these same counties 
would take a wholly different line. They would actively 
seek to prevent it from being recognised and would take 
all available steps to isolate it, both regionally and 
internationally. 
 
Another aspect of Kosovo that was widely seen 
to provide an important framework for Republika Srpska 
was the International Court of Justice (ICJ) Advisory 
Opinion on Kosovo, delivered in 2010. While the opinion 
deliberately avoided passing judgement on whether 
                                                                                                               
conviction that in view of the conflict of the 1990s and the extended 
period of international administration under SCR 1244, Kosovo 
constitutes a sui generis case which does not call into question 
these principles and resolutions.’ Press Release, 2851st Council 
meeting, General Affairs and External Relations, External Relations, 
Brussels, 18 February 2008. For a critique of the ‘unique case’ 
argument in the case of Kosovo, see James Ker-Lindsay, ‘Preventing 
the Emergence of Self-Determination as a Norm of Secession: An 
Assessment of the Kosovo ‘Unique Case’ Argument’, Europe-Asia 
Studies, Volume 65, Number 5, 2013. 
58 Kosovo joined the two organisations in 2009 due to the voting 
power of the United States and the other main EU states that 
recognised it. The previous year, the IMF had undertaken a study 
and concluded that, ‘it has been determined that Kosovo has 
seceded from Serbia as a new independent state and that Serbia is 
the continuing state.’ ‘Statement on Membership of the Republic of 
Kosovo in the IMF’, Press Release No. 08/179, July 15, 2008. 
26 
 
Kosovo is in fact a state, it did affirm that general 
international law places no prohibition on the right of 
territories to declare independence.59 This was read very 
positively by Dodik. As he explained at the time, ‘the ICJ 
decision can serve us as guidance for our continuing 
fight over our status and our future.’60 However, a close 
reading of the opinion in fact reveals that it further 
undermined Bosnian Serb efforts to secede. The Court 
was clear that while there was no inherent prohibition 
against unilateral declarations of independence, there 
are circumstances when such a declaration could be 
expressly banned, for example by a Security Council 
Resolution. As well as citing the 1983 Turkish Cypriot 
unilateral declaration of independence, the Court 
specifically referred to Resolution 787 (1992), which 
called on states to respect Bosnia’s territorial integrity 
and specifically precluded the independence of 
Republika Srpska.61 In reality, the opinion makes any 
attempt by the Bosnian Serbs to secede harder, not 
easier.62 
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While Kosovo may not offer a useful model, 
another potential challenge to Bosnia’s territorial 
integrity would appear to come from the prominent 
independence movements in Western Europe. As Dodik 
noted, ‘We are following what is going on in Italy (South 
Tyrol), in Scotland and even in Catalonia. These are 
crucial experiences for the RS.’63 Scotland, in particular, 
was felt to be a hugely important case for the Bosnian 
Serb leader. He genuinely saw this as a means by which 
to bolster his own case for statehood.64 In reality, the 
Scottish example offered little if any useful lessons for 
Bosnia. Leaving aside the fact that Scotland had once 
been an independent state in its own right, a factor that 
actually has no bearing on subsequent claims to 
independence under international law,65 the key 
element in the Scottish case was the decision of the 
British Government to permit the referendum and, if 
successful, to engage in a negotiated separation. 
Following in the footsteps of Canada, which had 
permitted several referendums of Quebec’s 
independence, it was this element of consent that would 
have made the whole process acceptable had Scotland 
voted for statehood. For this reason, the international 
                                                          
63 ‘Scottish Independence Referendum Raises Bosnian Serbs’ 
Independence Hopes’, AFP, 15 September 2014. See also, ‘Catalans 
Spurn Links with Bosnian Serbs’, Balkan Insight, 30 January 2014. 
64 International official, comment to the author, October 2015. 
65 For example, the fact that Somaliland was an independent state 
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community was quick to emphasise that there could be 
no link between what was happening in Scotland and 
efforts by RS to pursue statehood.66 Perhaps more to the 
point, the people of Scotland eventually voted to reject 
independence. As officials in Bosnia noted, Dodik barely 
hid his disappointment at the outcome.67 
 
While Catalonia could potentially offer a more 
useful model for Republika Srpska, it also serves to 
reinforce just how difficult it is to obtain independence, 
even when there is not deep-rooted international 
hostility to the cause of secession. Despite considerable, 
though by no means overwhelming, support for 
independence in Catalonia,68 repeated efforts by Catalan 
leaders to push statehood onto the national agenda 
have been rejected by the Spanish Government. Madrid 
has repeatedly insisted that it will not engage with 
Catalonia’s leaders on the subject of independence and 
has stood in the way of efforts to pursue statehood. For 
example, a planned independence referendum, which 
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was due to be held in September 2014, was cancelled 
after the Spanish Constitutional Court ruled that it would 
be unconstitutional and the Spanish Government 
announced that it would take any and all necessary 
steps should the vote go ahead.69 Instead, the 
authorities in Barcelona organised a non-binding, 
unofficial vote on the matter. Despite an active 
campaign by supporters of independence, this only 
secured a 30 per cent turnout. Thereafter, regional 
elections, held on 27 September 2015, were presented 
as a plebiscitary vote, with almost all the pro-
independence parties standing as a unified bloc. While 
they won a majority of seats in the regional assembly, 
they did not manage to gain a majority of the vote.70 
While the pro-independence camp insists that it is 
pressing ahead with independence, at present it is not 
clear how this will be achieved. Madrid remains still 
strongly opposed to statehood. Meanwhile, officials 
from the European Commission have suggested that 
Catalonia would not automatically be a member of the 
EU. It would have to apply to join.71 At the same time, it 
seems hard to see how any EU member would recognise 
a unilateral declaration of independence by Catalonia – 
a step that would fundamentally break the bonds of EU 
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solidarity.72 And without the support of the EU, it is also 
hard to see how any other states, including the United 
States, would recognise an independent Catalan state. 
Lastly, on a side note, it is perhaps worth mentioning 
that leading pro-independence figures in Barcelona are 
openly unhappy at the comparisons that might be drawn 
between their quest for statehood and the case of 
Republika Srpska. Indeed, the National Catalan Assembly 
has even issued a public statement criticising Dodik.73 
 
More recently, Crimea’s unilateral secession from 
Ukraine, in March 2014, seems to have been raised as a 
potential model for Republika Srpska to emulate.74 It 
was telling that at the time Dodik congratulated the 
people of Crimea on a ‘democratic and fair referendum’ 
and welcomed their subsequent decision to ‘join the 
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Russian Federation’.75 This led to claims that the Bosnian 
Serb president had actively planned to secede at that 
point too, but that this was eventually thwarted by the 
Serbian Government,76 an allegation later refuted by 
Dodik.77 However, of all the recent models of secession 
or attempted secession, Crimea actually has the least to 
offer Republika Srpska. For a start, the illegality of 
Russia’s actions over Crimea is not seriously contested.78 
Although an attempt to condemn the move in the UN 
Security Council was blocked by Russia, a subsequent UN 
General Assembly Resolution reaffirmed the ‘territorial 
integrity of Ukraine’.79 Meanwhile, the referendum, 
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secession and subsequent annexation of Crimea have 
been strongly condemned by, amongst others, the EU 
and the United States.80 Both of which have imposed 
sanctions on Moscow for its actions.81 More to the 
point, even if it did declare independence, RS would 
certainly not be annexed by Serbia. Indeed, Belgrade 
would not recognise a unilateral declaration of 
independence. 
 
 
Serbia and an attempted secession 
 
It has long been recognised that any de facto 
entity, if it is to have any chance of survival, requires 
some sort of outside patron.82 In the face of strong 
opposition from the international community, this 
patron becomes a vital lifeline, providing access to goods 
and services in the face of any sanctions or other 
punitive steps that may be imposed.83 (In many cases, 
                                                                                                               
abstentions. The countries voting against the resolution were: 
Armenia, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, North Korea, Nicaragua, Russia, 
Sudan, Syria, Venezuela and Zimbabwe. 
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though by no means all cases, such a patron state is also 
a kin state; a state that is made up of the same ethnic 
group as the breakaway territory.84) The need for such 
support can be seen in almost every current case of de 
facto statehood. For example, in the case of Northern 
Cyprus, Turkey stands behind the Turkish Cypriots. For 
Nagorno-Karabakh, it is Armenia. In the case of 
Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria, the lifeline is 
Russia; even though Moscow has not actually recognised 
the last one of these. Indeed, one could argue that one 
of the reasons why Iraqi Kurdistan, which in many ways 
meets the requirements of statehood and would be sure 
to gain a certain degree of support if it did try to secede, 
does not formally declare independence is because it 
does not have a regional patron that would be able to 
                                                                                                               
incidental to statehood. These territories have no international 
airports; no trade agreements or visa arrangements for recognition 
of their passports; customs and border entanglements with their 
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Karabakh’, Ethnopolitics, Volume 7, Number 4, 2008. 
34 
 
support and defend it.85 The one solid exception to this 
rule is Somaliland’s quest for independence from 
Somalia. However, its viability is based on the fact that it 
has broken away from a state that has an exceptionally 
weak central government, and which is functionally 
unable to oppose its de facto statehood, and because it 
enjoys a high level of international support and 
legitimacy.86 Nevertheless, it has been repeatedly told 
that it must get Somalia’s permission before it will be 
accepted as an independent state by the international 
community.87  
 
In the case of Republika Srpska, any attempt at 
secession would require, at the very least, the active 
support of Serbia. Even then, this would not allow a 
unilateral declaration of independence to succeed. 
Instead, it would merely protect it against the most 
damaging impact of any punitive measures adopted by 
the European Union and the United States; assuming 
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formal UN condemnation was not possible. However, RS 
would not receive Belgrade’s support.88 While Serbia 
may have been willing to prop up a secessionist Bosnian 
Serb state during the 1990s, it is inconceivable that it 
would do so today. For a start, after having sent officials 
around the world to try to lobby countries not to 
recognise the unilateral declaration of independence by 
Kosovo on the basis that it is contrary to international 
law, it would be an act of monumental double standards 
for it then to recognise and support secession in Bosnia. 
Secondly, any indication at all that the Serbian 
Government is supporting Republika Srpska would 
immediately bring its EU accession negotiations to a 
halt. Of course, some may argue that Belgrade would 
put Serbian solidarity over integration. It would not. 
Over the course of the past few years Belgrade has been 
involved in an EU-led process to normalise relations with 
Pristina. This process, which has gradually seen Serbia 
loosen its ties with Kosovo, and accept Kosovo’s 
presence on the international stage, has been done as a 
necessary condition to advance its EU membership 
prospects.89 The Serbian Government has not spent the 
last five years taking these painful steps on Kosovo in 
order to further its EU accession prospects only for it to 
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throw everything away by supporting what would be an 
entirely unsuccessful effort to secede by Republika 
Srpska. And, thirdly, under the current Serbian 
Government ties between Belgrade and Sarajevo have 
been steadily improving. During his premiership, the 
Serbian Prime Minister, Aleksandar Vučić, has actively 
sought to build up better relations with Bosnia. It was 
particularly noteworthy that his first foreign trip after 
assuming office, in 2014, was to Sarajevo, not Banja 
Luka. There he pledged his support for Bosnian unity and 
territorial integrity; albeit in a form that would not 
jeopardise the continuing existence of Republika Srpska 
as an integral part of the Bosnian state.90 This effort to 
enhance the links between the two countries has since 
been continuing. In November 2015, the two 
governments held their first joint session and pledged to 
build up their relations still further,91 much to the 
obvious annoyance of the Bosnian Serb leader.92  
 
Having said all this, it is important to note that 
while Serbia may be strongly opposed to any attempt by 
Republika Srpska to secede this should not be read to 
mean that Belgrade would necessarily be able to stop 
the Bosnian Serb leadership from pursuing a push for 
independence should it be determined to do so. It is 
                                                          
90 ‘Serbia pledges support for single Bosnia amid secessionist 
rhetoric’, Reuters, 13 May 214. 
91 ‘Serbia, Bosnia Pledge Closer Ties After Tensions’, Balkan Insight, 
4 November 2015. 
92 ‘Dodik not thrilled about Vucic’s visit to Sarajevo’, Bosnia Today, 4 
November 2015. 
37 
 
now fairly well established that while a kin state does 
play an important role in the domestic affairs of a 
secessionist entity, it cannot always exercise decisive 
control.93 This has been seen particularly clearly in the 
case of Serbia and Republika Srpska. Whereas the 
previous government in Serbia, led by Boris Tadić, had 
little ability to control Dodik,94 Vučić and the Bosnian 
Serb leader do not enjoy particularly good relations.95 
This could well limit Belgrade’s direct control over 
events. Nevertheless, its indirect control remains 
absolute. The fact remains that any attempted secession 
would simply be unviable without the support of Serbia. 
                                                          
93 Caspersen, ‘Between Puppets and Independent Actors’. 
Interestingly, this happened with the 1983 Turkish Cypriot 
declaration of independence. The Turkish Government explicitly 
stated that it was not in favour of UDI. However, the Turkish Cypriot 
assembly went ahead and seceded anyway. The difference was that 
Turkey had stated in advance that, if a declaration of independence 
did occur, it would have no choice but to recognise the new state, 
which is exactly what happened. 
94 ‘Weber: Dodik wanted to initiate secession of the Republika 
Srpska; Vucic stopped him’, Radio Free Europe, 17 September 2014; 
‘Vucic's Serbia distances itself from Dodik’, Dnevni Avaz, 8 May 
2015. 
95 ‘Weber: Dodik wanted to initiate secession of the Republika 
Srpska; Vucic stopped him’, Radio Free Europe, 17 September 2014. 
This is also understood by diplomats based in the region. Although 
Vučić has family ties to Bosnia through his father, unlike Tadić, who 
was also of Bosnian Serb extraction, he appears to have no 
particular personal ties to Bosnia. As stated to the author by several 
Serbian officials. 
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For this reason, as one senior Serbian official stated, ‘RS 
independence is utopia. It won’t happen.’96 
 
 
Downplaying the significance of an 
independence referendum 
 
Despite the overwhelming legal and political 
impediments to an attempted secession, the widespread 
perception that Republika Srpska could nevertheless try 
to break away continues to have a deeply destabilising 
effect. To this end, any steps that could conceivably 
foreshadow a declaration of independence are 
becoming a source of tension in their own right.97 The 
most obvious example is the threat to hold a 
referendum on statehood. 
 
When viewed from a dispassionate perspective, 
there is very little reason why a referendum on 
independence should be treated as a particularly serious 
challenge. If independence is not a viable outcome, then 
it follows that a public vote on whether to secede should 
not be given undue significance, either within Bosnia or 
by the international community. More to the point, even 
                                                          
96 Serbian diplomat, comments to the author, October 2015. This 
was echoed by a Bosnian Serb civil society activist in conversation 
with the author, in December 2015. This person acknowledged that 
a declaration of independence would be a disaster for the Bosnian 
Serbs, and they know it. 
97 ‘Communiqué of the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation 
Council’, 2 December 2015. 
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if a vote did go ahead, and showed overwhelming 
support for independence, it would have no real bearing 
on the situation.98 It is accepted under international law 
that a unilateral attempt to secede based on a popular 
vote is no more legal or legitimate than an attempt to 
declare independence without a referendum.99 In truth, 
as one diplomatic observer put, such a referendum in 
Bosnia would amount to nothing more than an opinion 
poll.100 Certainly, in other contexts, such votes have 
been resolutely ignored by the international community. 
For instance, in February 2012, Kosovo Serbs held a 
referendum in which 99.7 per cent voted against any 
rule by Pristina. While it certainly showed that an 
                                                          
98 ‘In many cases referenda conducted in territories wishing to 
secede have returned very substantial majorities in favour (in the 
range of 65-99%). But even in cases where there is a strong and 
continued call for independence, it is a matter for the government 
of the State concerned to consider how to respond.’ James 
Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, 2nd Edition 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p.417. 
99 As has been noted: ‘In international practice there is no 
recognition of a unilateral right to secede based on a majority vote 
of the population of a sub-division or territory, whether or not that 
population constitutes one or more “peoples” in the ordinary sense 
of the word. In international law, self-determination for peoples or 
groups within an independent state is achieved by participation in 
the political system of the state, on the basis of respect for its 
territorial integrity.’ James A., Crawford, ‘State Practice and 
International Law in Relation to Unilateral Secession’, Report to 
Government of Canada Concerning Unilateral Secession by Quebec, 
19 February 1997. 
100 Senior international official, comment to the author, November 
2015. 
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overwhelming majority of the community wished to 
remain under Serbia’s rule, something that was already 
widely known, it made absolutely no difference at all to 
the situation on the ground. The Kosovo Parliament 
simply wrote it off, stating that it ‘does not produce any 
legally and politically binding effect and as such is not 
valid.’101 It was also widely condemned 
internationally.102 Rather than set the stage for more 
instability, as many had predicted, the vote had no 
substantive impact whatsoever on the development of 
the situation in Kosovo. It was rapidly forgotten. In the 
case of Bosnia, the same model could be adopted. 
Moreover, there is always the likelihood that the High 
Representative, using the Bonn Powers, would simply 
annul the vote on the grounds that it amounted to a 
violation of the peace accords.103 
 
Of course, this is not to ignore the dangers of 
such a vote if it were to be held. It would almost 
certainly pose a grave security risk. Even if there was a 
widespread understanding within the Bosniak 
community that it would have little significance, as one 
official noted, there is always the danger that a polling 
station could be attacked, even by a single individual. 
                                                          
101 ‘Serbs reject Kosovo Albanian rule in referendum’, BBC News, 16 
February 2012. Interestingly, the Serbian Government insisted that 
it was contrary to Serbia’s interests. 
102 ‘Commission deplores Serb’s Northern Kosovo referendum’, 
Euractiv, 14 February 2012. 
103 Senior international official, comments to the author, January 
2016. 
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Given that tensions would already be raised, this could 
rapidly lead to an escalation of fighting.104 Such concerns 
do need to be taken very seriously. To this extent, if a 
vote were to be held, it would inevitably necessitate 
heightened security precautions across the country. The 
key would be to ensure that such steps are fully 
explained and should not be seen to signal endorsement 
of the vote. Instead, it is merely being done to ensure 
that the referendum, as unwanted and meaningless as it 
would be, does not lead to confrontation. 
 
 
A unilateral declaration of independence would 
have little meaning 
 
Given the weight of opposition to secession, 
many observers, including some prominent Bosnian 
Serbs,105 believe that Dodik has no real intention of 
trying to break away.106 Instead, it would appear that his 
talk of seceding is in fact aimed at bolstering his own 
position,107 trying to secure or increase power and 
autonomy for Republika Srpska, or just merely ‘winding 
                                                          
104 Senior international official, comments to the author, January 
2016. 
105 As Igor Crnadak, Foreign Minister of Bosnia stated, look at what 
he is actually doing, not what he is saying. Interview with BBC 
Hardtalk, 13 January 2016. 
106 Various international officials, comments to the author, 
November 2015-February 2016. 
107 Andrew MacDowall, ‘Dayton Ain’t Going Nowhere’, Foreign 
Policy, 12 December 2015. 
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up’ local and international actors in the knowledge that 
talk of secession solicits a strong response.108 However, 
one cannot completely dismiss the possibility that 
Republika Srpska could attempt to secede at some point. 
If this were to happen it would inevitably plunge the 
country into crisis. In such circumstances, it would be 
vital to manage the situation effectively and ensure that 
it did not lead to fighting. A key element of this counter-
escalation strategy would be to put such a development 
in its proper context and to emphasise that there are a 
many non-violent steps that could be taken to manage 
and resolve the situation. 
 
In the first instance, it is important to stress that 
a unilateral declaration of independence has little 
meaning in itself. Ultimately, its significance is based on 
whether it is recognised by others.109 For all the reasons 
highlighted earlier, this will not happen. Nevertheless, 
the government would want to show that it is taking 
active steps to deal with the situation. In this context, a 
usual first step for a country facing such a situation is to 
assert its continuing territorial integrity and call on 
states not to recognise the breakaway territory.110 In the 
case of Bosnia, even if there was no UN Security Council 
resolution condemning the move, it would seem almost 
                                                          
108 Former EU official in Bosnia, comments to the author, December 
2015. 
109 Ambassador Harun-ur-Rashid [former Bangladeshi Ambassador 
to the UN in Geneva], ‘Side-Stepping the Legitimacy Issue of 
Kosovo’, The Daily Star (Bangladesh), 4 August 2010. 
110 Ker-Lindsay, The Foreign Policy of Counter Secession, pp.77-79. 
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certain that the declaration of independence would be 
immediately annulled by the High Representative. 
Likewise, one would expect strong statements from the 
European Union, the United States and a number of 
other countries. 
 
At the same time, it would be almost certain that 
steps would be taken to isolate Republika Srpska – 
economically, politically and geographically. It hardly 
needs to be said that an attempted secession would end 
most, if not all, international assistance and foreign 
investment in Republika Srpska. It is also highly likely 
that the EU and United States, amongst others, would 
impose sanctions on the RS and its leaders. Perhaps 
more importantly, one would expect that the Bosnian 
Government to announce the closure of the border 
between Republika Srpska and neighbouring Croatia, 
Montenegro and Serbia and declare the international 
airport in Banja Luka, the Bosnian Serb capital, off 
limits.111 While some smuggling of goods would certainly 
                                                          
111 Article 1 of the 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation 
states that, ‘The contracting States recognize that every State has 
complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its 
territory.’ Article 6 ‘No scheduled international air service may be 
operated over or into the territory of a contracting State, except 
with the special permission or other authorization of that State, and 
in accordance with the terms of such permission or authorization’. 
For more on this issue see, Stefan Talmon, ‘Air Traffic with Non-
Recognised States: The Case of Northern Cyprus’, < 
http://users.ox.ac.uk/~sann2029/FCO_Paper%20by%20Dr%20Stefa
n%20Talmon.pdf > (Last accessed, 8 December 2015. 
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occur, it is highly doubtful that this would be on the 
scale necessary to support the population indefinitely. 
Meanwhile, not only would Republika Srpska be cut off 
from the outside world, by virtue of the District of Brčko 
it would also be physically divided into two.112 This 
would mean that the western part, which includes Banja 
Luka, would have no boundary with Serbia. This would 
lessen the impact of illegal trading. Moreover, it would 
inevitably have an enormous impact on the effective 
functioning of the Bosnian Serb state. Of course, some 
will no doubt claim that the RS could nevertheless 
survive, as it did in the 1990s. This is unlikely. A 
breakaway Bosnian Serb state, cut off from the outside 
world, and with its two parts separated from each other, 
would face enormous challenges. The general view of 
observers is that it would be unsustainable.113  
 
A third factor to consider would be the decision 
by the Bosnian Serb institutions to cut all cooperation 
with the central government and for Bosnian Serbs to 
pull out of the central state institutions.114 Any decision 
                                                          
112 International official, comments to the author, January 2016. 
Former international official in Bosnia, comments to the author, 
February 2016. 
113 Former EU official in Bosnia, comments to the author, December 
2015; former international official in Bosnia, comments to the 
author, February 2016. 
114 While this would be linked to the attempted secession, it should 
be noted that this could well occur even without an attempt at 
independence. Most recently, at the end of 2015, Dodik threatened 
that all RS officials could walk out of state institutions over a 
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to boycott the central state bodies would certainly 
create a highly complicated and destabilising situation. A 
comprehensive plan would need to be put in place to 
ensure that the state could continue to operate 
effectively. This is perfectly doable. Emergency 
measures could be enacted, with support from the High 
Representative and other relevant international actors, 
to ensure that the decision-making procedures continue 
to function. While unwelcome, such developments are 
not unknown and, as Cyprus has shown, states can still 
operate efficiently, and democratically, under such 
conditions.115 But even if a walkout were to happen, 
                                                                                                               
proposed reform to the Constitutional Court. ‘Serb Leader Warns 
Bosnia could Break Up’, Balkan Insight, 2 December 2015. Shortly 
afterwards, RS announced that it had suspended cooperation with 
state-level police and judicial authorities after five suspected war 
criminals were arrested and entity offices in RS were searched for 
evidence; a move that was widely condemned by international 
authorities in the country, and even by the Serbian Government. 
‘Bosnian Serbs Halt Cooperation with State Police, Court’, Balkan 
Insight, 10 December 2015. 
115 For example, in the case of Cyprus, following the departure of 
the Turkish Cypriot community from the institutions of the state, in 
late-1963, the doctrine of necessity was adopted. This allowed the 
Constitution to continue to operate despite the fact that many of its 
provisions explicitly required Turkish Cypriot participation. Indeed, 
the doctrine remains in force to this day. More to the point, the fact 
that the country was operating under what was essentially a 
stopgap measure did not serve as an impediment to the country’s 
accession to the European Union, in 2004. For more on this see, 
Achilles C. Emilianides, ‘Accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the 
EU, the Constitution and the Cypriot Doctrine of Necessity’, Cyprus 
Yearbook of International Relations, 2007, pp.65-82 
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there are those who believe that it could be a relatively 
short term situation. In view of the isolation the Bosnian 
Serbs would face, it is likely that is a way to persuade 
people to return to their posts, albeit with some 
concessions.116  
 
Once again, none of this is intended to unduly 
minimise, let alone dismiss, the extreme dangers of a 
unilateral declaration of independence by Republika 
Srpska. As with a referendum, if not more so, there 
would be a very serious risk that such a development 
could plunge the country back into fighting. Rather, this 
very brief overview of the key steps that could be taken 
if an attempt at secession were to happen is meant to 
emphasise that the somewhat natural view that such a 
step would inevitably lead to renewed conflict should be 
challenged. If an attempt to break away did occur, it 
would be crucial to try to maintain as much calm as 
possible. This is best achieved by highlighting what such 
a step would mean in practical and legal terms, and by 
explaining the range of options that would be available 
to the central state and to the international community 
in order to counter such a move. In the extremely 
unlikely event that RS did try to break away, Bosnia 
would undoubtedly face a period of severe crisis. 
However, it need not face a return to war. 
 
 
                                                          
116 Former international official based in Bosnia, comments to the 
author, February 2016. 
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Conclusion 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina has deep rooted political 
problems. Twenty years after the end of fighting, the 
country remains highly divided. In this febrile and fragile 
environment, threats by the leadership of Republika 
Srpska to pursue independence only serve to create 
even greater uncertainty and fuel the view that Bosnia is 
on the brink of a return to fighting. However, talk of 
secession should be treated with utmost caution. A 
declaration of independence does not represent a 
credible threat to the territorial integrity of Bosnia. As 
has been shown, the international community retains a 
very strong structural opposition to secession. In the 
past seventy years only one country, out of a total 
current membership of 193 states, has managed to join 
the UN after unilaterally seceding; and even then it did 
so only when the parent state accepted its existence. 
Additionally, Bosnia is protected by a number of other 
very specific safeguards, ranging from UN resolutions 
guaranteeing its sovereignty and territorial integrity, 
through to the support of leading international powers 
that would do everything to ensure that a Bosnian Serb 
state does not gain recognition. Meanwhile, claims that 
Russia would support an attempt at secession should be 
viewed with scepticism. Russia has a lot to lose by being 
seen to support what would ultimately be a failed bid to 
break away. 
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As for the arguments that some other recent 
examples of secession, either actual or attempted, have 
strengthened the possibility the RS could succeed, a 
closer examination of these cases in fact shows that they 
work against it and not in its favour. Kosovo has 
managed to gain considerable international recognition, 
but only because it has been so strongly supported by 
the United States and key members of the European 
Union. And yet, even with this support, eight years after 
declaring independence, it is still only recognised by just 
over half of the UN. As for Scotland, its vote on 
independence was held with the explicit and express 
support of the British Government. Meanwhile, the 
strong obstacles to Catalonia’s efforts to hold a 
referendum show just how difficult it is to secede if the 
central government remains opposed. Lastly, for any 
attempted secession to succeed, it would need the 
support of Serbia. This will not happen. Serbia will not 
ruin its EU accession prospects and again become an 
international pariah by supporting an endeavour that 
would have no chance of success. (For this reason, any 
talk of secession and subsequent union with Serbia is 
even more unrealistic.) Without Belgrade’s backing, RS 
would have no future as an independent state. At best, 
it would be internationally isolated and far more 
impoverished than it is now. As one former official put it, 
no one in RS wants to become another Transnistria.117 
 
                                                          
117 Former international official in Bosnia, comments to the author, 
December 2015. 
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And yet, despite these factors, the view 
continues to persist that an attempted secession 
represents a very real threat to the territorial integrity of 
the country. This in turn serves to feed tensions. There 
are several reasons why this might be the case. In part, 
this may be due to the fact that people are unaware just 
how implausible secession really is. Few appear to have 
seriously considered the practical aspects of a unilateral 
declaration of independence.118 Then again, the view 
that secession is a threat could also be a deliberate 
attempt by those close to the problem to generate 
greater international interest in what is, admittedly, a 
very unstable situation that is far too often neglected 
these days.119 Talk of secession may also be a useful 
smokescreen for failure by all sides. It is a convenient 
way for Bosnian Serb figures to keep their population 
focused on an unattainable goal as a means of 
encouraging unity in the face of growing internal 
divisions. For the Bosniaks, it is a convenient way to 
explain away the failings of the Federation. Meanwhile, 
for the international actors, it is also a good way to 
justify the ongoing deadlock in the country.120 
                                                          
118 Former EU official in Bosnia, comments to the author, December 
2015. 
119 Former international official in Bosnia, comments to the author, 
December 2015. Former international official in Bosnia, comments 
to the author, February 2016. This has also been mentioned by a 
number of other observers the author spoke to when preparing this 
piece.  
120 Bosnian Serb civil society activist, comments to the author, 
December 2015. 
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Regardless of the reasons, one thing is clear: Dodik 
benefits. While it is certain that any attempt by the RS 
leadership to secede would have no chance of being 
recognised within the region, let alone by the wider 
international community, the mere perception that it 
could succeed is proving to be enough to raise tensions. 
This raises its political leverage.121  
 
Ultimately, the idea that secession is a viable 
prospect is sowing the seeds of the very instability that 
needs to be avoided. Indeed, the perception that 
Republika Srpska could break away is in many ways a far 
greater danger than secession itself. As the old adage 
goes: what people believe to be real is real in its 
consequences. The mere fact that many observers, both 
in and outside the country, believe that secession is a 
serious possibility and will lead to the disintegration of 
the state is enough to fuel the very tensions that could 
lead the country down the path of renewed fighting and 
fragmentation. In this regard, the past obviously weighs 
heavily on the present. It cannot and should not be 
forgotten that the country descended into warfare 
precisely because of an attempt at secession.122 
However, it is important to put this past in the proper 
contemporary context. The chaos and violence of the 
early 1990s was centred on a specific set of 
circumstances that do not exist today. Yugoslavia was 
                                                          
121 Former international official in Bosnia, comments to the author, 
February 2016. 
122 Bosnian political analyst, comment to the author, October 2015. 
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collapsing. Today, there is a clear understanding that the 
borders of the Balkans are now settled. Officials have 
repeatedly insisted that there can be no redrawing of 
the boundaries of the region.123 This needs to be 
underlined in Bosnia. 
 
The same also applies to his threat to hold a 
referendum on secession. The international community 
needs to adopt a calm and measured indifference 
towards any vote. It needs to be made clear that a 
referendum, if held, will have no practical consequences 
and, if necessary, its results will be declared invalid. 
Certainly, there is a good case to be made that the 
current approach, whereby observers present a 
referendum as something to be feared because it could 
somehow have some sort of practical destabilising 
effect, is actually doing more harm than the alternative 
strategy of downplaying its political and legal 
significance, and allowing it to go ahead with minimum 
fanfare. Although a referendum would certainly be a 
highly unwelcome development, it should not be 
allowed to become a source of tensions merely because 
there is a prevailing, and erroneous, view that the mere 
act of holding a popular vote will somehow substantively 
and adversely legitimise what would still be an illegal 
act. 
 
In private, every official interviewed for this piece 
acknowledged that there is no credible threat that RS 
                                                          
123 ‘“Borders will not be redrawn in Balkans”’, B92, 28 March 2014. 
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would successfully secede. It may try, although unlikely, 
but it will not succeed. The problem is that the 
international actors involved in Bosnia have not as yet 
found an effective way of countering the threat to 
stability posed by talk of a referendum or a unilateral 
declaration of independence. They know that by giving 
the ‘danger’ of secession credibility, they are granting 
Dodik power and leverage over the situation. However, 
they are also aware that ignoring the issue altogether 
would merely let the problem brew and suggest to the 
Bosniak community that they were not taking the threat 
of separatism seriously.124 It is how to strike the balance 
that is proving difficult. Admittedly, they face a difficult 
conundrum; especially as some feel that highlighting the 
threat of secession and renewed conflict is the only way 
to encourage high-level interest in the region’s broader 
problems.125 However, it is nevertheless a dangerous 
strategy that could ultimately do more harm than good. 
On balance, it would seem more prudent to put the 
threat of secession in its proper international legal and 
political context and seek to dampen concerns. This 
paper is an attempt to do just that. Suggestions that RS 
could secede must be more widely challenged. Members 
of the international community – be they decision-
makers or opinion-formers– would be better advised to 
avoid stoking tensions by giving credibility and undue 
                                                          
124 This was stated to the author by several senior diplomats based 
in the region in conversations with the author in December 2015 
and January 2016. 
125 International official, comment to the author, February 2016. 
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significance to threats by the leadership in Banja Luka 
that it intends to hold a referendum and then break 
away. Instead, efforts should be made to explain more 
widely why this cannot and will not succeed and by 
elucidating the various steps that could be taken even if 
independence were to be declared. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina certainly faces many problems. However, 
the secession of Republika Srpska should not be seen as 
one of them. Such a scenario should not be allowed to 
create unnecessary instability, and thus inadvertently 
help create the conditions for renewed conflict. 
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